SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW

In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the
more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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ARBITRATION AND AWARD-ARBITRATORS
KNOWN SUBSTANTIAL

SHOULD MAKE

BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP

VITH ANY

PARTY AND DISCLOSE ALL FACTS WHICH MIGHT INDICATE INTEREST OR CREATE PRESUMPTION OF BIAS-Barcon Associates
v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 172 N.J. Super. 186, 411 A.2d 709
(App. Div. 1980).

Barcon Associates, Incorporated (Barcon) entered into a written
subcontract with Tri-Countv Asphalt Corporation (Tri-County) for
construction work on a Chester, New Jersey shopping center. 160
N.J. Super. 559, 563, 390 A.2d 684, 686 (Law Div. 1978). The contract contained an arbitration clause whereby the parties agreed to
submit all disputes to a panel of three arbitrators. Each party was
authorized to designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators chosen
by the parties would select the third. Id.
A dispute arose between Barcon and Tri-County, and arbitrators
were selected in accordance with the procedures outlined above. Barcon designated Vincent A. Spatz, the president and principal stockholder of V.A. Spatz Excavating and Paving Company (Spatz Co.), as
an arbitrator. Id. Prior to and throughout the arbitration hearings,
Barcon and Spatz engaged in substantial ongoing business transactions. Id. at 563-65, 390 A.2d at 686-87. These transactions remained
undisclosed to Tri-County and the other two arbitrators until after the
award was rendered in favor of Barcon. Id. at 563, 390 A.2d at 686.
Pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-7 (West 1952), Barcon
commenced a summary action in the law division to confirm the arbitration award against Tri-County. After a full hearing, in which testimony from the three arbitrators as well as employees of both parties
was elicited, the judge vacated the arbitration award finding that
there was "evident partiality" on the part of one of the arbitrators
within the meaning of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-8(b) (West 1952). 160
N.J. Super. at 563, 390 A.2d at 686. Barcon appealed this decision to
the appellate division which affirmed the judgment of the lower
court. 172 N.J. Super. at 186, 411 A.2d at 709.
There were no proofs adduced showing that the arbitrator in
question had actually acted in a biased or partisan manner during the
proceedings. 160 N.J. Super. at 571, 390 A.2d at 689. Nevertheless,
it was Tri-County's position that the mere existence of business relationships was suggestive of favoritism and dependence. Id. at 567,
390 A.2d at 687. The appellate division agreed with the trial court in
its finding that the appearance of bias or partisanship, regardless of
whether it was actually present, was diametrically opposed to the
quasi-judicial function of arbitration which requires minimally accept-
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able standards of impartiality and independence. 172 N.J. Super. at
190, 411 A.2d at 711.
The court registered its approval of the rule expressed in Comwoniwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145,
150, rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1969). As long as all the parties
involved in an arbitration proceeding are fully informed, in advance,
of a substantial business relationship that exists between an arbitrator
and a party to the dispute, such arbitrator would not automatically be
disqualified from his position. 172 N.J. Super. at 190, 411 A.2d at
711. The burden of disclosing the existence of the relationship is
placed upon the arbitrator or the party who nominated him. Id.
In a situation where such a relationship is not revealed, the court
found the rule adopted in Richco Structures v. Parkside Village, Inc.,
82 Vis.2d 547, 263 N.W.2d 204 (1978) to be applicable. 172 N.J.
Super. at 191, 411 A.2d at 711. The test to determine if an arbitration
award should be Vacated for "evident partiality" is whether a reasonable party to an arbitration proceeding, upon learning of the relationship, would suspect the arbitrator's impartiality to the extent where
such party "'would demand that the arbitration be conducted on
terms which would provide checks on the arbitrator's exercise of discretion, or would take other protective measures to assure an impartial arbitration and award. [263 N.\W.2d at 213].'" Id.
Although it has not been held that arbitrators must shape their
conduct to conform with the standards prescribed for article III
judges, they must maintain an unbiased attitude in performing their
duties. The affirmative duty to disclose the existence of a business
relationship between an arbitrator and a party to the proceeding will
allow the arbitration procedure to remain a viable method for resolving disputes, thereby alleviating, to some extent, the ever increasing
workload of our overcrowded courts.

CHARITIES-TORTS-Loss OF TORT IMMUNITY THROUGH
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY-Kasten v. Y.M.C.A., 173 N.J. Super.
1, 412 A.2d 1346 (App. Div. 1980).
Plaintiff Mimi Kasten was injured in a fall on December 26,
1976, at the Arrowhead Ski Resort in Marlboro, New Jersey. A negligence action was filed claiming that the defendant Y.M.C.A.,
operator of the ski resort, had rented to the plaintiff skiing equipment
which was in bad repair and poorly fitted. Not being a member of the
Y.M.C.A., plaintiff was required to pay a higher tow fee. 173 N.J.
Super. at 3-5, 412 A.2d at 1347-48.
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In a motion for summary judgment, defendant invoked charitable
immunity under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West Cur. Supp.
1979-80), which bars tort recovery where the plaintiff was "'a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the works"' of the defendant charity.
173 N.J. Super. at 6, 412 A.2d at 1349. Defendant argued that the ski
resort was a part of' the general charitable scheme of the nonprofit
corporation.
The superior court, law division, found that Ms. Kasten had
been a "'recipient of the benefactions'" of the defendant, Y.M.C.A.,
and therefore her suit was barred b N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7.
Id. at 5, 412 A.2d at 1349. The superior court, appellate division,
reversed and remanded. In writing fi)r the court, Judge King relied
upon Mayer v. Fairlawn Jewish Center, 38 N.J. .549, 186 A.2d 274
(1962), in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey construed N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7. In that case, the supreme court ruled that
the particular relationship of the plaintiff to the defendant charity is
the controlling factor. Judge King inferred from Mlayer that charitable
immunity under the statute does not arise automatically with "[p]laintiff's mere presence on the defendant's property or use of defendant's
facilities," and that as a nonmember/user, plaintiff is not necessarily
barred from suit where a member/user would be. 173 N.J. Super. at
8, 412 A.2d at 1350.
The appellate division also held that although an\y profits from
the commercial ski operation were used to defray the costs of the
Y.MkI.C.A.'s charitable works, the organization was not immune from
liability for negligence arising out of the operation of the facility. In
support of this holding, the court cited several out-of-state decisions,
as well as the common law rule that charitable tort immunity is lost
for commercial activities even though the profits from those activities

are ultimately used for the organization's charitable purposes. Id. at
9, 412 A.2d at 1350.
The Kasten court thus has defined the limits of' New Jersey's
charitable immunity statute by' holding that nonmember patrons of'
commercial establishments operated by charitable organizations are
not barred from civil recovery by N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 2A:53A-7.

INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES-ABA
Allen CHARGE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS IN NEW JERSEY-State c. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392. 413

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-

STANDARDS

REPLACE

CONVENTIONAL

A.2d 593 (1980).
John Stanley Czachor was charged with twice threatening the life
of Mrs. Mary Catrone with a pistol. His trial was completed in one
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day, whereupon the case was sent to the jury. Three times the jury
reported an impasse in its deliberations. Each time the trial judge delivered a modified Allen charge, and each time the defendant failed to object. On the third day, one hour after the last Allen charge had been
given, the jury returned with "unanimous guilty verdicts on four of
the six counts." 82 N.J. at 394-95, 413 A.2d at 594. On appeal the
defendant argued that giving supplemental instructions to a deadlocked jury for the third time was plain error. The appellate division
rejected the argument and affirmed the convictions in an unpublished
opinion. Id. at 395, 413 A.2d at 594.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, agreed with the
defendant's contention that the cumulative effect of the three charges
was so inherently coercive and potentially prejudicial as to aniount to
reversible error. Id. at 394, 413 A.2d at 594. Remanding the case for
a new trial, the court recommended the use of the ABA model charge
instead of the modified Allen instructions employed by New Jersey
courts in the recent past. Id. at 405, 413 A.2d at 599. Furthermore, the court declared that it could no longer countenance conventional Allen charges in criminal trials and held that this prohibition
would have a limited retroactive effect. Id. at 408, 413 A.2d at 601.
Three justices, apparently favoring complete retroactivity, would have
preferred to reserve the retroactive effect issue for a later case. hI. at
411, 413 A.2d at 602 (Pashman, J., concurring).
Reevaluating the arguments concerning the Allen charge, the
New Jersey supreme court in Czachor followed the example of courts
in three federal circuits and twenty-two states which have condemned
it because of "'the substantial risk that the right to a fair trial at the
hands of an impartial jury is jeopardized by its use." Id. at 398, 413
A.2d at 596. A charge containing coercive features, with or without
balancing language, was held to violate basic requirements of a fair
trial. Without reaching the question of constitutionality, the court
prohibited the use of the Allen charge by exercising its supervisory
power.
Turning to the specific circumstances in Czachor, the court first
scrutinized the three Allen charges individually and found each to be
deficient. While the only coercive feature of the first two instructions
was their exclusive focus upon the dissenting jurors, an additional
fault of the third charge was its emphasis on "'the inconvenience and
costs of a mistrial and retrial." hi. at 403, 413 A.2d at 598. The court
then examined the repeated use of the charge and held such repetition to be "'[an] error possess[ing] a clear capacity for producing an
unjust result,'" mandating reversal. Id. at 402, 404, 413 A.2d at 598,

599.
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Having condemned the use of a conventional modified Allen
charge, the court also rejected the corresponding New Jersey Model
Criminal Charge because of similar deficiencies. N.J. Model Jury
Charges, Crim. No. 4, 190 (1978). While awaiting review by its
Committee on Criminal Practice, the court approved the ABA model
charge and adopted the concomitant recommendations for its use. Accordingly, such a charge should be included in the initial general instructions to the jury and any repetition is subject to the trial court's
sound discretion. 82 N.J. at 404-07, 413 A.2d at 599-600.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-JUVENILE
OF ADJUDICATION

DELINQUENCY-

RECORDS

OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CANNOT BE

EXPUNGED-State v. ,.J.A.,

173 N.J. Super. 19, 412 A.2d 1355

(Law Div. 1980).
Petitioner, a thirty-five year old male applying for an Atlantic
City casino employee license, sought expungement of records adjudicating him to be a juvenile delinquent. 173 N.J. Super. at 19-20,
412 A.2d at 1356. Those records revealed a series of convictions and
arrests for assault and battery, carnal abuse, and disorderly persons
offenses which occurred between 1961 and 1966. Id. at 21, 412 A.2d
at 1356.
Superior Court Judge Porreca noted that pursuant to N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 5:12-89(b)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980), and N.J. Admin.
Code § 19:41-714 (Supp. 1979) an applicant is required to reveal on a
personal history disclosure any criminal and arrest records. 173 N.J.
Super. at 20, 412 A.2d at 1356. Contained within the disclosure were
inquiries as to whether the applicant had "ever been arrested or
charged with any juvenile offense . . . in this state or any other jurisdiction," and whether the applicant or any member of his/her immediate family "ha[d] ever been arrested, indicted and/or charged
with or convicted of a criminal or disorderly persons offense." Id.
This last question, however, provided that any expunged record
would not have to be disclosed. Id.
Under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-1 to -32, as amended by L. 1979,
c. 178, §§ 108-39 (West 1979), expungement of records is available for
certain convictions where there have been no prior or subsequent
convictions (except for a disorderly persons offense) and for almost all
arrests. The court pointed out that except for the expungement of a
conviction for possession or use of a controlled dangerous substance
by anyone who was twenty-one years old or younger at the time of
the offense, the expungement statute does not address any juvenile
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delinquent convictions. 173 N.J. Super. at 21, 412 A.2d at 1357; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-5, as amended by L. 1979, c. 178, § 112 (West
1979). Furthermore, the court noted that juvenile delinquency offenses are not considered to be crimes. Id. at 25, 412 A.2d at 1358;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-64 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
Judge Porreca found that the only remedy available for the nondisclosure of juvenile records was to file a petition to "seal" those
types of records. 173 N.J. Super. at 21, 412 A.2d at 1357; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:4-67 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). Even though the
petitioner's records were sealed, they would not qualify for nondisclosure on the casino license application under the expungement exception. 173 N.J. Super. at 22, 412 A.2d at 1357. The petitioner urged
that since the "sealing remedy [was] inadequate .. . expungement
should be authorized." Id.
Citing In re R.C.C., 151 N.J. Super. 174, 376 A.2d 614 (J. &
D.R. Ct., Cape May County 1977) as distinguishable in that it held
that dismissed charges of juvenile delinquency could be expunged,
the court reasoned that such a remedy did not immediately attach to
juvenile delinquency convictions. 173 N.J. Super. at 22, 412 A.2d at
1357. R.C.C. was useful in the instant case, however, because it
pointed out that the expungement statute was intended to come into
play "where a defendant's contacts with the criminal justice system
are some indication of innocence-arrests, dismissals, acquittals." 151
N.J. Super. at 177-78, 376 A.2d at 616. Judge Porreca observed, as
did the court in R.C.C., that the expungement laws provide a "far
more effective" remedy than the sealing statute when attempting to
mask a defendant's prior connections with the criminal justice system.
173 N.J. Super. at 23, 412 A.2d at 1357. Expunged records may only
be inspected when good cause is shown that those records are needed
for judicial proceedings or litigation. Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-19,
as amended by L. 1979, c. 178, § 126 (West 1979). Sealed records,
however, lnay be inspected by any individual pursuant to a court
order and are reactivated upon subsequent criminal conviction. 173
N.J. Super. at 23, 412 A.2d at 1358; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4-67(d) &
(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). The V.J.A. court found a conflict
between the limited protection -afforded by the sealing statute and the
overall "rehabilitative purposes of our juvenile delinquency law." 173
N.J. Super. at 23-24, 412 A.2d at 1358.
The Casino Control Commission statutes and regulations and the
New Jersey statutes covering expungement and sealing laws create a
disparity in the treatment of individuals who, as adults, were able to
have their criminal convictions expunged, and those persons who, as
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adjudicated juvenile delinquents, were only allowed to have their
prior records sealed. As the court in W.I.A. recognized, such a result
is seemingly incongruous when the alleged purpose behind juvenile
delinquency statutes is to afford youths a fresh start. This protective
approach which the State of New Jersey has evidenced toward its
youthful offenders is severely undercut when conflicting statutes and
administrative regulations are recognized and yet allowed to continue.

INSURANCE -CIVIL

PROCEDURE -INJURED

PARTY NOT ESTOPPED

FROM LITIGATING ISSUE OF INTENT IN CIVIL ACTION ON IN-

SURANCE POLICY AFTER DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL CONVICTION-Garden State Fire & Cas. Co. v. Keefe, 172 N.J. Super. 53,
410 A.2d 718 (App. Div. 1980).

Ronald Keefe was insured under a homeowner's comprehensive
policy issued by Garden State Fire & Casualty Co. (Garden State)
which "'excluded from personal liability coverage 'bodily injury or
property damage which is either expected or intended from the
standpoint of the Insured.'" 172 N.J. Super. at 56, 410 A.2d at 719.
Keefe was the defendant in a negligence action brought by John Kelley for personal injuries suffered when Keefe fired a shotgun over the
heads of three youths, including Kelley, who were throwing snowballs at Keefe's car. As a result of that incident, Keefe was indicted
for atrocious assault and battery to which charge he eventually
pleaded guilty. Id.
Garden State, in a declaratory judgment action against Keefe and
Kelley, sought to determine the applicability of the exclusion provision of the insurance policy. The trial court granted Garden State's
motion for summary judgment, holding 'that the criminal conviction
on its face established the fact of Keefe's intent." Id. The superior
court, appellate division, reversed the trial court, ruling that in these
circumstances the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not automatically
apply. Instead, "the innocent victim here did have a right to litigate
the intent question in his pending civil action against the insured
....
at 55, 410 A.2d at 719.
.id.
The appellate court noted the New Jersey supreme court's disposition of a similar question in Burd v. Sussex Autual Ins. Co., 56
N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970). There, a criminal conviction for atrocious
assault and battery did not preclude the litigation of the question of
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intent by either the victim or the insured in a subsequent civil trial.
In deciding the issue, the court relied on public policy considerations
and the lack of mutuality necessary for estoppel. Id. at 398-99, 267
A.2d at 15-16. Recently, the supreme court reaffirmed its commitment to public policy considerations in Ambassador Ins. Co. v.
Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978).
The Keefe court found further support of its holding in Lyons c.
Hartford Ins. Group, 125 N.J. Super. 239, 310 A.2d 485 (App. Div.
1973), certif. den., 64 N.J. 322, 315 A.2d 411 (1974). That case involved an exclusionary clause identical to the one in the instant case,
and the court ruled that insurance coverage would attach where an
intentional act resulted in an unintended injury. Whether or not the
acts would support a criminal conviction was not taken to be dispositive of the intent issue.
In an attempt to preclude the parties from litigating the issue of
intent, Garden State relied on New lersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Brower,
161 N.J. Super. 293, 391 A.2d 923 (App. Div. 1978). Garden State
claimed that the Brower case eliminated the mutuality requirement
of estoppel. As the Keefe court pointed out, however, there can be no
automatic application of collateral estoppel because the goal of the
court system is to have factual cases "full', fairly, and definitively
litigated." 172 N.J. Super. at 59, 410 A.2d at 721. The requirement
of mutuality in a particular case depends on the facts involved and
the public policy considerations implicated.
Another factor weighed by the court in reaching its decision was
Keefe's plea of guilty to the charge. The result of this quilty plea, the
court felt, was less than a full litigation of the issue of intent. The
court stated that "itwould be unfair for the victim of defendant's
conduct to be precluded from seeking a civil recovery, by defendant's
entirely unilateral and self-interested decision to w\aive trial of the
criminal charge." Id. at 61, 410 A.2d at 721. Accordingly, the court
held that while the criminal conviction may be introduced as evidence 1w the insurance company declining coverage, such evidence is
not conclusive and the claimant may relitigate questions of coverage
under the policy.
In Keefe, the court declined to automatically, invoke collateral estoppel in a non-mutuality situation. Public policy considerations were
properly balanced to ensure that an innocent victim has the opportunity to litigate all questions which may not have been full\, determined
in a criminal action against the insured. Such a holding provides that
a claimant will be adequately protected in his right to a fair hearing
on all factual issues involved.
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LIMITATION OF

ACTIONS-STATUTE

OF LIMITATION

FOR PER-

SONAL INJURY ACTION TOLLED WHERE PLAINTIFF'S FORMER
COUNSEL

MISTAKENLY

FILED IN

WRONG

COURT AND

DE-

WOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED-Galligan v. Westfield
Centre Sercice, Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 412 A.2d 122 (1980).
FENDANTS

Plaintiff's decedent, Mary F. Galligan, was involved in an
automobile accident on April 17, 1975. She died one month later,
allegedly from injuries suffered in that accident. Plaintiff, claiming
diversity of citizenship, filed a complaint on April 14, 1977, in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against
Westfield Centre Service, Inc. and Chrysler Corporation. This action
was dismissed by the district court for lack of jurisdiction upon a finding that plaintiff and defendant Westfield Centre Service, Inc. were
citizens of New Jersey. 82 N.J. at 190, 412 A.2d at 123.
Two days before the federal claim was dismissed, plaintiff filed a
nearly identical complaint in tile Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division. The trial court, applying N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West
1952), granted defendants' motion to dismiss the superior court action
since the suit was commenced two years and twenty-two days after
the cause of action arose. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 provides for a
two year limitation period in which all suits for personal injury must
be initiated. No existing exception to the statute of limitation was
found to be applicable. The appellate division upheld this position
and denied plaintiff's leave to appeal without considering the merits.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the trial court, recognizing that because of the harsh results statutes of limitations sometimes yield, courts have developed "a common law of limitation." 82
N.J. at 191, 412 A.2d at 124. This doctrine has been used to avoid
injustices which would occur with a literal application of statutes of
limitations, while fully implementing the legislative purposes behind
the enactment or such statutes.
The court found that statutes of limitations create security and
stability for individuals in our society by compelling suit within a
reasonable time -after the alleged wrong is committed. Id. at 191-92,
412 A.2d at 124. This allows for the eventual repose of the action, as
well as ensuring that information crucial to a defending party will not
be lost through time. It was also recognized, however, "that a mistake in the selection of a court having questionable or defective juris-
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diction should not defeat tolling of the statute when all other purposes of the statute of limitations have been satisfied." Id. at 193, 412
A.2d at 124.
Pertinent to the court's reasoning was that the state court complaint was substantially similar to the one filed in federal court, and
defendants' concession that their case would not be prejudiced lby the
lapse of twenty-two days. "Since the passage of an additional 22 days
has impaired neither the defendants' ability to litigate nor the court's
capacity to adjudicate, plaintiff's cause of action has not become
"stale."' Id. at 194, 412 A.2d at 125.
The Galligan court found support for the decision in its inherent
equitable powers. Using a standard of "minimal substantial compliance," the court was satisfied that test was met by plaintiff's diligence in filing a suit within a two year period after the accident. Id.
at 194-95, 412 A.2d at 125. It would be inequitable, the court stated,
to deny plaintiff the opportunity to present his case, especially where
the choice of court error was not made by him, but by his attorney.
Id. at 194, 412 A.2d at 125.
Justice Pollock, in dissent, contended that a statute of limitations
is not tolled by the filing of a complaint in a court that does not have
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 197, 412 A.2d at 126 (Pollock, J.,
dissenting). The dissenting opinion pointed out that New Jersey has
not enacted a "saving statute" of the kind adapted in other states. Id.
Such a statute provides that a party may pursue an action which
would otherwise be prohibited if the claim has been dismissed on
grounds other than its merits. Justice Pollock distinguished all the
cases relied upon by the majority, noting that each involved an action
brought in a court which was competent to hear or transfer the case
to the proper court. No such power was in the district court in this

case. There is no statutory authority allowing a federal court to transfer an action to a competent state court. Id. at 198, 412 A.2d at 127.
The trial court, then, should have been affirmed and the suit dismissed, according to the dissent.
In Galligan, the New Jersey supreme court invoked the "coinmon law of limitations" where a strict application of the statute would
have yielded an inequitable result. The court did not, however,
create a strict rule of law to be applied in all such cases. Instead, the
facts of the case were closely analyzed in order to balance the equities.
Since the purposes of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 would not be frustrated by holding the limitations period tolled, the court declined to
rigidly enforce the statute, opting for a more flexible approach.
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MOTOR VEHICLES-OWNER OF CAR WHO NEGLIGENTLY LEAVES
KEYS IN UNATTENDED VEHICLE NOT LIABLE FOR INTENTIONAL
INJURIES

INFLICTED WITH

OFFICER-Berko v. Freda,

STOLEN

CAR ON ARRESTING

172 N.J.

POLICE

Super 436, 412 A.2d 821

(Law Div. 1980).
Ralph Freda left the keys in his car and it was stolen. After receiving a report of the theft over the radio, Police Officer Berko saw
the vehicle and gave chase. In an unsuccessful attempt to escape, the
thief rammed the police car three times. When both automobiles
were finally stopped, the police officer approached the stolen car.
While the officer had his arm in the open door, the youthful driver
intentionally stepped on the accelerator, dragging and injuring Berko.
172 N.J. Super. at 436, 412 A.2d at 821. The police officer brought a
negligence action against the owner of the car, but defendant Freda's
motion for summary judgment was granted. Id. at 442, 412 A.2d at
824.
To support his motion, defendant advanced theories novel to
New Jersey law. Initially, defendant argued that the owner of a stolen
automobile should not be held liable for its use as an instrument of
intentionally tortious acts by the thief, even where the owner's negligence facilitated the theft. Id. at 437-40, 412 A.2d at 822-23. Defendant also invoked the fireman's rule claiming that, by analogy, a
police officer should also be barred from recovery for injuries sustained in the ordinary course of his duties. The trial court agreed
with both contentions.
Addressing defendant's first argument, Judge Griffin conceded
that liability had been found in two related situations. The owvner of a
car who left the keys in the ignition was held liable for the negligent
acts of the car thief. Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139, 380 A.2d 1107
(1977); Zinck v. Whelan, 120 N.J. Super. 432, 294 A.2d 727 (App.
Div. 1972). In another instance, the owner of an apartment building
who neglected to repair a door lock was held liable for the criminal
acts of a burglar. Braitman c. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368,
346 A.2d 76 (1975). The court, however, saw a closer connection between the instant case and the situation in Dwyer v. Erie Inv. Co.,
138 N.J. Super. 93, 350 A.2d 268 (App. Div. 1975).
In Dwyer, the owner of a building failed to close a hole which
provided access for intruders, but was not held liable for gun shot
wounds inflicted on plaintiff by a suspected burglar emerging from
the hole. Affirming judgment for defendant, the appellate division
reasoned that both Zinck and Braitman were distinguishable. Without
referring explicitly to Zinck, the Dwyer court termed it "a policy de-
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cision applied to particular fact situations" and described Braitman as
a case "arising out of a landlord-tenant relationship." Id. at 100, 350
A.2d at 272. Moreover, the events leading to Dwver's injury were
found to be "'beyond the scope of reasonable foreseeability" and thus
not legally caused by defendant's conduct. hi. at 101, 350 A.2d at 273
(emphasis in original). Quoting this passage from Dicyer, Judge Griffin held that as a matter of law it was similarly unforeseeable that a
thief would use a stolen car as a weapon to assault a police officer.
Defendant was, therefore, entitled to summary judgment. 172 N.J.
Super. at 442, 412 A.2d at 824.
The court then considered defendant's second argument that the
fireman's rule should be applied to policemen. As stated in Krantl t.
Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960), the rule forecloses fire
fighters from receiving any compensation for injuries suffered in the
line of duty other than their pay and workmen's compensation benefits. Public policy demands such a rule, particularly in the absence
of' "wanton" conduct or violation of a statute bv the owner whose
property is on fire. Id. at 274-77, 157 A.2d at 131-32. Persuaded by
the reasoning of other state courts, Judge Griffin subscribed to the
analysis that a policeman is "'a person who, fully aware of the hazard
created by the defendant's negligence, voluntarily confronts the risk
for compensation.'" 172 N.J. Super. at 441, 412 A.2d at 824 (quoting
Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 202, 204, 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977)).
Summary judgment could have been based on this ground alone.
Instead, it was premised on the controversial theories surrounding
tort liability for the acts of third persons. The New Jersey supreme
court has provided firm guidance in this area through its decisions in
Braitman and Hill, both of which ftillv adhered to the Zinck doctrine.
Unfortunately, by relying on the appellate division's decision in
Dwyer, the trial court in the present case chose a precedent of lesser
weight and questionable validitv.

RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY-ILLEGITIMACY
RULE TO LIMIT STATUTORY
PARTY

IN

BASTARDY

-CONSTRUING
COURT
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL TO EITHER

PROCEEDING

WOULD

VIOLATE

v. C., 172 N.J. Super. 123, 410 A.2d 1199
(Law Div. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 172 N.J. Super. 360, 412
A.2d 128 (App. Div. 1979).
CONSTITUTION-G.

Plaintiff, who was the recipient of welfare assistance from Union
County, filed a notice of appeal with the New Jersey superior court
after her bastardy and support action was dismissed by the juvenile
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and domestic relations court on March 7, 1978. 172 N.J. Super. at
125, 410 A.2d at 1200. A demand for trial by jury was contained in
that notice of appeal. Defendant, the alleged father, asserted that the
plaintiff was not entitled to that right. Id.
The plaintiff found support for her contention in statutory language which states that any party "aggrieved" in a bastardy proceeding could appeal to the county court and "[u]pon request of either
party the appeal shall be tried before a jury." N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9-17:20 (West 1976) (emphasis added). The defendant, on the other
hand, relied upon a court rule promulgated by the New Jersey supreme court, N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-6, which provides that such a proceeding "shall be heard . . . without a jury unless defendat demands trial
by jury in his notice of appeal." N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-6 (emphasis added).
At the outset, Judge Callahan of the New Jersey superior court,
law division, acknowledged that a conflict existed between the statute
and the rule. 172 N.J. Super. at 126, 410 A.2d at 1200. See Sarte v.
Pidoto, 129 N.J. Super, 405, 409, 324 A.2d 48, 50-51 (App. Div.
1974). The G. v. C. court, after examining the tentative draft comment of the rule, reasoned that the supreme court did not intend that
the right to trial by jury be limited. 172 N.J. Super. at 126, 410 A.2d
at 1200. The court pointed out that a discrepancy existed even between the tentative draft comment and the rule: the rule refers to the
"'defendant's' right, while the comment uses the term 'appellant.' "

Id. The court concluded that the drafters used the terms interchangeably and, therefore, this mere change, as contained in the rule, was
intended to implement whatever statutory right existed. Id.
Judge Callahan explained that the apparent confusion created by
the term "'defendant" as contained in the rule, arose out of the
anomalous nature of a bastardy proceeding." Id. at 127, 410 A.2d at
1201. The term "defendant" would suffice ill the context of an appeal

of a criminal matter but bastardy cases are essemtiallv civil actions. Id.
In light of the "iisapprehiension of the nature of the proceeding" the
rule was interpreted to aflOrd the right to trial by jury to either party.

172 N.J. Super. at 127, 410 A.2d at 1201.
Furthermore, Judge Callahian concluded that the right to trial by
jury was protected by the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 131, 410
A.2d at 1202. The applicable section provides that "[tlhe right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate." N.J. CONST., art. 1, para. 9. This
clause protected the right to trial by jury that existed in all matters at
common law when the Constitution of 1776 was adopted. 172 N.J.

Super. at 128, 410 A.2d at 1201. After tracing the history of the right
to trial by jury in bastardy proceedings, the court concluded that such
a right did exist at common law ill 1776. Id. at 128-31, 410 A.2d at
1201-03.
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Judge Callahan's decision was affirmed by the appellate division
of the New Jersey superior court in a per curiam opinion. 172 N.J.
Super. 360, 412 A.2d 128 (App. Div. 1979).
The matter of whether both parties in an appeal of a bastardy
proceeding are entitled to a trial by jury has long been recognized as
an area of dispute. The court in G. v. C. resolved that issue, thereby
achieving two goals-allowing both parties to enjoy this basic right,
and simultaneously removing the criminal taint from this civil action.

